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Although a number of respected experts argue that Ukraine can hardly expect to get a better, more pro-
reform government that would be prepared to dig what has been piled in the domestic economic
Augean stables , the circle of those willing to join the pinch-the-government game has been expanding.
An expanded session of the Cabinet of Ministers, held on April 19, 2000 and attended by President
Leonid Kuchma and Speaker Ivan Pliushch, attracted keen interest: this government had to report about
its activity for the first time, and the President was expected to hear the report.
Opening the session, Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko announced that the new Cabinet was summing
up initial results of Ukraine's economic and social development. The focus was on the first quarter of
2000, the period rich in specific events, including the President's annual address to the Verkhovna
Rada, Ukraine: Towards the XXI Century , adoption of a zero-deficit 2000 state budget, approval of the
government's action plan, Reforms for Well-being , successful restructuring of Ukraine's foreign debts,
and, on the other hand, growing uncertainty in Ukraine's relations with the IMF.
Although the government's report quoted optimistic figures - GDP growth by 5.6%, and industrial
output growth by 9.7% compared to last year - and although no dismissals of the Cabinet officials
occurred, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the session was painless enough for the
government. President Kuchma strongly criticized the government for insufficiently active and not
always well-thought steps in the pursuit of reform, and warned against excessive optimism in
evaluation of the economic performance in the first quarter of 2000. Specifically, he noted that the
positive trends in Ukraine's economy and related economic indicators had not been linked to deep
qualitative changes in the economy and, therefore, could not be viewed as sustainable. The President
argued they were rather a result of inertia processes, related to substantial devaluation of hryvnya
during the previous period following the Russian crisis and some growth of payment-able demand as a
result of partial compensation of wage and pension arrears. (TSN, Studio 1+1, April 19, 2000).
Hence, there was a loud slam of the Cabinet's door, but nobody was left out - for a while, for it appears
that some of the Cabinet's officials may be looking for new jobs in a few months. In fact, this wave of
criticism is not the first one within the relatively brief period of the Yushchenko government. Yet, only
a few months ago, on December 21, 1999, members of the parliament applauded the approval of Victor
Yushchenko as the Prime Minister. 296 MPs out of 318, who were present in the assembly hall,
including 10 members of the Socialist party endorsed his nomination.
The first strongly critical remarks were addressed to the government a few weeks later, when the 2000
state budget was formed and approved. The government was criticized for major social security cuts
and abolishing of benefits, although Yushchenko repeatedly stressed the draft budget was socially
oriented . The criticism did not cease after the state budget was adopted on February 17, 2000, this time
focusing on the failure to comply with the budget's target indicators.
The next wave of criticism concerned the government's program of action, submitted to the parliament
for approval on March 13, 200, as Reforms for Well-being . Although it was explicitly stated that the
draft had been based on the Constitution of Ukraine and the President's recent annual address to the
parliament, Ukraine: Towards the XXI Century. Strategy of Economic and Social Development for
2000-2004 , it failed to secure eager attention and appreciation of law-makers. Some of them argued
they saw neither reforms nor well-being in the proposed draft, but neutral observers noted that negative
comments on the government's program were motivated by unsatisfied ambitions of political forces
that had been left out when the Cabinet had been formed. The exchange of critical remarks concerning
the draft between government officials and law-makers, naturally, did not make the former happy.
Thus, Minister of Economy Serhiy Tihipko put it bluntly: if the Verkhovna Rada did not approve the
government's program, it would be equal to the verdict of no-confidence in the prime minister and the
government and would push them to resign (Den, March 11, 2000). The reaction was First Vice
Speaker Victor Medvedchuk's uncompromising statement that the parliament will not be transformed
into a structure that stamps documents the government needs (Kievskie Vedomosti, March 14, 2000).
The government's program of action made it through the parliament and was approved on April 6, 200
by 261 votes, but the fact could hardly be viewed as the government's victory. Although the program
was approved in general , MPs introduced a number of conditions for cooperation and shared
responsibility with the government for the economic situation in the country, and insisted that the
government made quarterly reports to the parliament about the implementation process.
Another potential risk for the government's existence at the present time and in the present composition
is the so far futile hope that Victor Yushchenko would be able to negotiate successfully with the IMF to
ensure that payments within the EFF loan, suspended in September 1999, are resumed. The situation
became increasingly tense after the Financial Times published materials accusing the National Bank of
Ukraine of misuse of the IMF loans. The materials were quoted at length and commented in a variety
of ways by the Ukrainian media. Finally, it turned out that the IMF loans could be resumed only after
an international audit performed on the NBU was completed, i.e., not before June. The fact that
Ukraine would have to find a way to struggle without the IMF loans - and, possibly, other loans as well
- put additional pressure on the state's ailing finance. Ukraine's international image, especially in the
Western world, also suffered serious damage.
In the eastern direction, there is an acute problem of Ukraine's growing gas debt to Russia. The recent
session, so unpleasant for the government, evidently went under fresh impression of Russian President
Putin's visit to Ukraine a few days earlier. As the media described it, Leonid Kuchma's tirade, full of
sarcasm, that from now on making the gas balance for Ukraine and Russia will be the two presidents'
personal business, was obviously targeted at Vice Prime Minister for the fuel and energy complex,
former president of the UESU [United Energy Systems of Ukraine] corporation Yulia Tymoshenko,
who had failed to secure relevant payments by the subordinate agencies (Den, April 19, 2000). The
critical remarks referred Mrs. Tymoshenko's earlier unsuccessful negotiations with the Russian
Gazprom leadership in January 2000, after which she had announced an exorbitant amount of Ukraine's
gas debt: about US$2 billion. Later on Victor Yushchenko announced that the quoted figure was
unverified , and included commercial debts (Fakty i Kommentarii, 21 January 2000). Although the debt
was restructured, the problem of payment remains.
At the April 19 session of the Cabinet, the President aimed much of its hardy criticism at Yulia
Tymoshenko. Although Mrs. Tymoshenko argued in her speech that the reforms she had initiated in the
fuel and energy complex had already produced positive results, and that the measures taken had
allowed to improve collection of payments for gas and electricity in March, the problem was not cured.
Since January 2000, the total gas debt had grown by almost UAH 2.5 billion, and had reached UAH 7.9
billion by April 1, 2000. The energy debt had increased by UAH 1.5 billion and had reached UAH 8
billion by April 1. Commenting on the facts of extremely unsatisfactory performance of the fuel and
energy complex, Leonid Kuchma announced he did not understand the optimism demonstrated by Vice
Prime Minister Tymoshenko. The situation has come to the critical edge, the President argued and
added that it had been practically by magic that Ukraine's common energy system had not been
destroyed (Den, April 19, 2000).
Yet, Yulia Tymoshenko's resignation, predicted by many observers and decision-makers, did not occur
that time. Leonid Kuchma authorized Prime Minister Yushchenko to decide whether there was a need
to keep the position of the fuel and energy Vice Prime Minister. I agreed to the Prime Minister's
proposal to introduce a position of a vice prime minister for fuel and energy policy, taking into account
the need for a complex approach to that sphere. Today I have every reason to conclude [that] we have
not raised the energy [branch] but simultaneously lost economic reforms, for in fact [we] sacrificed the
position of a vice premier who was specifically dealing with the problem of economic reform in
Ukraine, he said (UT-1, UTN-Panorama, April 19, 2000). Leonid Kuchma's statement can be
interpreted as a direct hint to the Prime Minister. About a week before Leonid Kuchma publicly stated:
I am not an advocate of having the President approve, at the Cabinet's session, specific decisions on
these or those staff changes, but added that if the President suggests something, the government should
consider that. When asked if he was going to propose such changes, Leonid Kuchma answered simply
we'll live and see (Ukraina Moloda, April 20, 2000).
Under the impression of the wave of criticism received at the Cabinet's session, Victor Yushchenko
asked the President to accept his resignation (Zerkalo Nedeli, April 22-28, 2000) but Leonid Kuchma
rejected it. However, it appears that a real staff shake-up in the government may occur in some time.
Although the parliament cannot initiate resignation of the government within twelve months after it has
approved the government's program of action, there is nothing that would prevent the President from
doing so. While in March the President definitely argued that Yushchenko's resignation from the
position of the head of government was out of the question, that the government received the whole
load of global problems that must be solved without delay , and explained shortcomings in the
government's performance as a result of the team's young age (Kievskie Vedomosti, March 11, 2000),
in April he was more critical when evaluating the Cabinet's and its selected officials' performance. The
President warned against too much enthusiasm about economic indicators received in the first quarter
of 2000, as well as against acting from scratch , without taking into account the previous governments'
experience, and stressed that he was worried about the fact that much of government's decision-making
was based on intuition.
Still more criticism was addressed to the government's perceived focus on public events and PR actions
that, according to Kuchma, are becoming dogged (Studio 1+1, TSN, April 19, 2000). Possibly, the
comment was addressed to a number of hot lines between government officials and ordinary
Ukrainians, and the public reception office that received multiple complains of Ukrainians about
problems they face in their everyday lives. Observers have regarded these efforts of the government as
clearly image-making actions expected to raise Ukrainians' positive feelings about the government and
individual members of the Cabinet. Yet, the criticism of image-making actions resembled something.
On May 27, 1996, the press service of the President of Ukraine disseminated a statement that Prime
Minister Yevhen Marchuk did not ensure, as the situation demanded, effective and sustainable
operation of the government and, lately, instead of daily routine on organizing its performance [he]
focused his efforts on creating his own political image. Much of the criticism voiced by the President in
1996 can be easily applied to the present-day situation: low effectiveness of the Cabinet of Ministers ,
the government's documents are not being implemented , mane of them are declarative in nature , the
government does not forecast the development of economic processes but rather follows them,
adopting decisions based on their consequences , there has been no effective interaction with the
Verkhovna Rada in working on urgent bills . Yet, the analogy can hardly be regarded as an accurate
one: first, neither the press nor the public witnessed impressive image-making events organized Prime
Minister Yevhen Marchuk, and second, Yevhen Marchuk was prepared for radical action and was not
afraid of resignation.
Nowadays, the ranks of experts prepared to take the government's mistakes as a problem of growth .
Although permanent representative of the President of Ukraine in the parliament Roman Bezsmertnyi
argues that it is too early to make a radical evaluation of the government, given the fact that some of its
members have risen to such high positions for the first time... It would be very good if the current
government managed to achieve the level of becoming a real one team in at least half a year (Den,
April 20, 2000), there is a logical question whether this country has any more time to spend on waiting
and hoping.
The above suggests a number of possible conclusions:
1. President Kuchma have deliberately chosen the tactics of not firing any of the government's
members without Victor Yushchenko's agreement and a formal appeal. Earlier on, he announced he
was prepared to refrain from dismissing any of members of the Cabinet, i.e., showed unwillingness to
provoke any of the members of the Cabinet to join anti-Kuchma opposition.
2. Three and a half months are a long enough term for the government to start unpopular but necessary
pro-market decisions. Instead there is a budget, pushed with great hardships through the government,
fulfillment of which may be problematic due to re-introduction of earlier abolished benefits. The initial
months of large-scale privatization brought the revenues that are below the expected ones. There is also
the government's program of action, adopted too recently to have produced results. Yet, the President
demands on the government to show substantial progress either in the pursuit of the agrarian reform, or
the large-scale privatization, that would be significant enough to be considered as a breakthrough in the
economic reform process. It looks like his patience is about to end.
3. Meanwhile, Leonid Kuchma hardly has any candidate at the moment that would be better that Victor
Yushchenko, still prepared to perform the President's will. Even if Yushchenko submits his resignation,
the President may choose not to accept it for an indefinitely long period of time, and the Prime Minister
will have to continue doing his job as usually.
4. Since no vacancies have been opened in the government to be filled by representatives of competing
groups of interest willing to boost their influence, one may assume that currently the President sees
reality in a way somewhat different from the way it is seen by power-brokers that are eager to reform
the Cabinet. Hence, the new President demonstrates independence and readiness to act in accordance
with his interests that may not necessarily be shared by his circle. The fight between oligarchs allows
the President to prevent gaining too much strength by any of the teams and keep the situation under
control from above.
5. The purpose of the public criticism of the government is to exert pressure on Victor Yushchenko to
stimulate him to act and carry the whole burden of the unpopular reforms.
6. The President is annoyed not so much with the Cabinet members' public image-making activism
(though it would be incorrect to dismiss the possibility that Yushchenko's rivals interpret it to the
President as efforts to gain political score ) but rather by the fact that it consumes a major portion of the
government's time and efforts. Furthermore, the media - particularly the ones controlled by competitors
for influence , begin to be increasingly skeptical about the Cabinet's PR efforts.
7. There are a number of real challenges that need to be addressed by the government. One of them is
the issue of distribution of land in the Crimea, likely to become particularly acute in mid-May when
Crimean Tatars will mourn the anniversary of displacement from their historic homeland by Stalin in
1944. Notwithstanding the importance of the issue of giving Crimean Tatars access to participation in
land privatization, and potential challenges that may be created by the failure to address it adequately,
there is no government official who would be directly responsible for dealing with it.
8. According to sources in the parliament, practically every draft bill submitted by the government may
result in increase of the taxation pressure that in its turn may result in increasing shadowization of
economic activity and the growth in numbers of those who are dissatisfied with the reforms . In order
to prevent stronger criticism of the government Victor Yushchenko should do a number of practical
things: ensure the promptest possible submission of key pro-reform draft bills, primarily the Budget
Code, the Taxation Code and the Customs Code, so that the new 2001 budget - expected to be
submitted to the parliament by September 15 - could be drafted on a new basis. Other steps could be
increasing consistence in the pursuit of the administrative reform, implementation of a real agrarian
reform instead of liquidation of collective farms on paper , and developing the large-scale privatization.
Specifically, it is important to actualize the Prime Minister's declared commitment to promote
privatization of a number of key Ukrainian enterprises.
